## 1NC

### FW

#### The political *is* value to life—it is how originally solipsistic lives become incarnate and real to themselves.

Arendt 1958 [Hannah, *The Human Condition*, pp. 196-199]

The original, prephilosophic Greek remedy for this frailty had been the foundation of the polis. The polis, as it grew out of and remained rooted in the Greek pre-polis experience and estimate of what makes it worthwhile for men to live together (syzen), namely, the "sharing of words and deeds,"26 had a twofold function. First, it was intended to enable men to do permanently, albeit under certain restrictions, what otherwise had been possible only as an extraordinary and infrequent enterprise for which they had to leave their households. The polis was supposed to multiply the occasions to win "immortal fame," that is, to multiply the chances for everybody to distinguish himself, to show in deed and word who he was in his unique distinctness. One, if not the chief, reason for the incredible development of gift and genius in Athens, as well as for the hardly less surprising swift decline of the city-state, was precisely that from beginning to end its foremost aim was to make the extraordinary an ordinary occurrence of everyday life. The second function of the polls, again closely connected with the hazards of action as experienced before its coming into being, was to offer a remedy for the futility of action and speech; for the chances that a deed deserving fame would not be forgotten, that it actually would become "immortal," were not very good. Homer was not only a shining example of the poet's political function, and therefore the "educator of all Hellas"; the very fact that so great an enterprise as the Trojan War could have been forgotten without a poet to immortalize it several hundred years later offered only too good an example of what could happen to human greatness if it had nothing but poets to rely on for its permanence. We are not concerned here with the historical causes for the rise of the Greek city-state; what the Greeks themselves thought of it and its ralson d'etre, they have made unmistakably clear. The polis-—if we trust the famous words of Pericles in the Funeral Oration—gives a guaranty that those who forced every sea and land to become the scene of their daring will not remain without witness and will need neither Homer nor anyone else who knows how to turn words to praise them; without assistance from others, those who acted will be able to establish together the everlasting remembrance of their good and bad deeds, to inspire admiration in the present and in future ages.27 In other words, men's life together in the form of the polis seemed to assure that the most futile of human activities, action and speech, and the least tangible and most ephemeral of man-made "products," the deeds and stories which are their outcome, would become imperishable. The organization of the polis, physically secured by the wall around the city and physiognomically guaranteed by its laws—lest the succeeding generations change its identity beyond recognition is a kind of organized remembrance. It assures the mortal actor that his passing existence and fleeting greatness will never lack the reality that comes from being seen, being heard, and, generally, appearing before an audience of fellow men, who outside the polis could attend only the short duration of the performance and therefore needed Homer and "others of his craft" in order to be presented to those who were not there. According to this self-interpretation, the political realm rises directly out of acting together, the "sharing of words and deeds." Thus action not only has the most intimate relationship to the public part of the world common to us all, but is the one activity which constitutes it. It is as though the wall of the polis and the boundaries of the law were drawn around an already existing public space which, however, without such stabilizing protection could not endure, could not survive the moment of action and speech itself. Not historically, of course, but speaking metaphorically and theoretically, it is as though the men who returned from the Trojan War had wished to make permanent the space of action which had arisen from their deeds and sufferings, to prevent its perishing with their dispersal and return to their isolated homesteads. The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be. "Wherever you go, you will be a polis": these famous words became not merely the watchword of Greek colonization, they expressed the conviction that action and speech create a space between the participants which can find its proper location almost any time and anywhere. It is the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely, the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly. This space does not always exist, and although all men are capable of deed and word, most of them—like the slave, the foreigner, and the barbarian in antiquity, like the laborer or craftsman prior to the modern age, the jobholder or businessman in our world—do not live in it. No man, moreover, can live in it all the time. To be deprived of it means to be deprived of reality, which, humanly and politically speaking, is the same as appearance. To men the reality of the world is guaranteed by the presence of others, by its appearing to all; "for what appears to all, this we call Being,"28 and whatever lacks this appearance comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and exclusively our own but without reality.29

#### No solvency for their critique without institutional focus. We must try to change policy in order to change the world—the concentration of power in the hands of political elites is inevitable, so we must work within that system to check oppression and violence.

Themba-Nixon 2k [Makani, Executive Director of the Praxis Project, *Colorlines* 3.2, pg. 12]

The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. -ZX Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

### Cap K

#### Using imperialism as a focus point kills any chance at change —capital is transnational and imperialism is a byproduct - this ends any chance at a perm and makes the impacts worse by affirming institutions of global capital.

Robinson 7 (Professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, William, 2007, “Beyond the Theory of Imperialism: Global Capitalism and the Transnational State” Societies Without Borders, 2 (2007) 5-26 p. 9-16, RSR)

Harvey offers no explicit conception of the state but he acknowledges that state behavior has “depended on how the state has been constituted and by whom.” 17 Yet dual logics of state and capital ignore the real-world policymaking process in which the state extends backward, is grounded in the forces of civil society, and is fused in a myriad of ways with capital itself. It is incumbent to ask in what ways transnational social forces may influence a reconstitution of state institutions. To the extent that civil society – social forces – and capital are transnationalizing our analysis of the state cannot remain frozen at a nation-state level. The essential problematic that should concern us in attempting to explain phenomena associated with the “new imperialism” is the political management – or rule – of global capitalism. The theoretical gauntlet is how to understand the exercise of political domination in relation to the institutions available to dominant groups and sets of changing historical relations among social forces – that is, how are the political and the economic articulated in the current era? This requires a conception of agency and institutions. But instead of offering an ontology of agency and how it operates through historically constituted institutions, much of the “new imperialism” literature reifies these institutions. Institutions are but institutionalized – that is, codified – patterns of interaction among social forces that structure different aspects of their material relations. When we explain global dynamics in terms of institutions that have an existence or agency independent of social forces we are reifying these institutions. Critical state theories and Gramscian IPE 18 have taught us, despite their limitations, that the story starts – and ends – with historically situated social forces as collective agents. To critique a nation-state framework of analysis as I do, is not, as my critics claim19 to dismiss the nation-state but to dereify it. Reifying categories leads to realist analyses of state power and the inter-state system. Realism presumes that the world economy is divided up into distinct national economies that interact with one another. Each national economy is a billiard ball banging back and forth on each other. This billiard image is then applied to explain global political dynamics in terms of nation-states as discrete interacting units (the inter-state system). The state, says Harvey, in reverting to the realist approach, “struggles to assert its interests and achieve its goals in the world at large.” 20 But Harvey does not stop with this reification of the state. He introduces an additional territorial reification, so that territorial relations become immanent to social relations. “The wealth and well-being of particular territories are augmented at the expense of others,” writes Harvey. 21 This is a remarkably reii ed image – “territories” rather than social groups have “wealth” (accumulated values) and enjoy “well being.” Harvey gives space in this way an independent existence as a social/political force in the form of territory in order to advance his thesis of the “new imperialism.” It is not how social forces are organized both in space and through institutions that is the focus. Rather, for Harvey, territory acquires a social existence of its own, an agentic logic. We are told that “territorial entities” engage in practices of production, commerce, and so on. Do “territorial entities” really do these things? Or is it not that in the real world, individuals and social groups engage in production, commerce, and so on? And they do so via institutions through which they organize, systematize, and demarcate their activities as agents. Social groups became aggregated and organized in the modern era through the particular institutional form of the territorial-based nation state. But this particular institutional form does not acquire a life of its own and neither is it immutable. Nation-states continue to exist but their nature and meaning evolve as social relations and structures become transformed; particular, as they transnationalize. Drawing on insights from Lafebvre, Marx, Luxemburg, and others, Harvey earlier introduced the highly fertile notion of spatial (or spatial-temporal) fixes to understand how capital momentarily resolves contradictions (particularly, crises of overaccumulation) in one place by displacing them to other places through geographic expansion and spatial reorganization. Following Marx’ famous observation that the expanded accumulation of capital involves the progressive “annihilation of space through time,” he also coined the term “time-space compression” in reference to globalization as a process involving a new burst of time-space compression in the world capitalist system. 22 But “places” have no existence or meaning in and of themselves. It is people living in particular spaces that do this dis-placing (literally), these spatiotemporal fixes. The “asymmetric exchange relations” that are at the heart of Harvey’s emphasis on the territorial basis of the “new imperialism” must be for Harvey territorial exchange relations. But not only that: they must be nation-state territorial exchanges. But exchange relations are social relations, exchanges among particular social groups. There is nothing in the concept of asymmetric exchanges that by i at gives them a territorial expression; no reason to assume that uneven exchanges are necessarily exchanges that take place between distinct territories, much less specifically between distinct nation states. That they do or do not acquire such an expression is one of historical, empirical, and conjunctural analysis. Certainly spatial relations among social forces have historically been mediated in large part by territory; spatial relations have been territorially-dei ned relations. But this territorialization is in no way immanent to social relations and may well be fading in significance as globalization advances. Any theory of globalization must address the matter of place and space, including changing spatial relations among social forces and how social relations are spatialized. This has not been satisfactorily accomplished, despite a spate of theoretical proposition, ranging from Castell’s “space of flows” replacing the “space of place.” 23 and Giddens “time-space distanciation” as the “lifting” of social relations from territorial place and their stretching around the globe in ways that may eliminate territorial friction. 24 This notion of ongoing and novel reconfigurations of time and social space is central to a number of globalization theories. It in turn points to the larger theoretical issue of the relationship of social structure to space, the notion of space as the material basis for social practices, and the changing relationship under globalization between territoriality/geography, institutions, and social structures. The crucial question here is the ways in which globalization may be transforming the spatial dynamics of accumulation and the institutional arrangements through which it takes place. The subject – literally, that is, the agents/makers of the social world – is not global space but people in those spaces. What is central, therefore, is a spatial reconfiguration of social relations beyond a nation-state/inter-state framework, if not indeed even beyond territory. States are institutionalized social relations and territorial actors to the extent that those social relations are territorialized. Nation-states are social relations that have historically been territorialized but those relations are not by definition territorial. To the extent that the US and other national states promote deterritorializing social and economic processes they are not territorial actors. The US state can hardly be considered as acting territorially when it promotes the global relocation of accumulation processes that were previously concentrated in US territory. Harvey’s approach is at odds to explain such behavior since by his definition the US state must promote its own territorial aggrandizement. Harvey observes that as local banking was supplanted by national banking in the development of capitalism “the free flow of money capital across the national space altered regional dynamics.” 25 In the same vein we can argue that the free flow of capital across global space alters these dynamics on a worldwide scale. Let us return to the question: why would Harvey propose separate logics for the economic and the political – for capital and the state? By separating the political and the economic he is able to claim that indeed globalization has transformed the spatial dynamics of accumulation – hence capital globalizes – but that the institutional arrangements of such global accumulation remain territorial as nation-states. The state has its own independent logic that brings it into an external relation to globalizing capital. Here we arrive at the pitfall of theoreticism. If one starts with the theoretical assumption that the world is made up of independent, territorial-based nation states and that this particular institutional-political form is something immanent to the modern world – Wood makes the assumption explicit, a law of capitalism; for Harvey it seems implicit – then the changing world of the 21st century must be explained by theoretical i at in these terms. Reality must be made to conform to the theoretical conception of an immutable nation-state based, inter-state political and institutional order. But since Harvey acknowledges the reality of globalizing capital he is therefore forced to separate the logic of that globalizing capital from that of territorially-based states; he is forced either to abandon the theoretical construct altogether or to build it upon a dualism of the economic and the political, of capital and the state. Theory needs to illuminate reality, not make reality conform to it. The pitfall of this theoreticism is to develop analyses and propositions to fit theoretical assumptions. Since received theories establish a frame of an inter-state system made up of competing national states, economies and capitals then 21st century reality must be interpreted so that it fits this frame one way or another. Such theoreticism forces theorists of the “new imperialism” into a schizophrenic dualism of economic and political logics. In any event Harvey has trapped himself in a blind alley that underscores the pitfall. Despite his acknowledgement of capital’s transnationalization he concludes that the US state’s political/territorial logic is driven now by an effort to open up space vis-à-vis competitor nation-states for unloading national capital surplus, hence the new US imperialism. This inconsistency in Harvey’s argumentation reflects a general contradiction in the “new imperialism” literature: the dualism of the economic and political, of capital and the state, is negated by the claim that the US state functions to serve (US national) capital.

#### Privileging discourse and ideas guarantees mystifying the material conditions that cause class oppression – only a return to material criticism can confront the material oppression of global capitalism

Zavarzadeh 3 (Mas’ud, “The Pedagogy of Totality” p.3-4, in “JAC: A Journal of Rhetoric, Culture, and Politics”, Volume 23.1, http://www.jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol23.1.html)

Berube's lesson obscures this CIA which is an extension of U.S. corporations and whose task is to wage a clandestine class war against the working people of the world to keep the world safe for U.s. investment. There is no hint in his teaching of the event that the CIA's actions might be symptoms of the systematic aggression of market forces against the workers and that the event might be an outcome ofmarket forces. In his teaching, the CIA becomes a story machine producing absorbing stories that circle around personalities, places, and actions but lead nowhere. They build an illusion of knowing. Analysis ofthe economic role ofthe CIA (which produces material knowledge of global relations) is ob- structed by details that have no analytical effect. Why, for instance, did the CIA fight to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan? Berube's "waging the cold war" seems to imply that the dynamic of the conflict is "ideology." The U.S. and the Soviets simply had two different "political" systems and cultures. Thus, in Berube's version ofhistory, it is natural that the CIA wanted to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan and increase the U.S.'s sphere of political and cultural power in the region. The conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States is, in other words, a clash of ideas. Underlining his pedagogy is, in other words, a view of history as an expansionism of "power" (see Hardt and Negri) and as conflicts of "ideologies" (see Fukuyama). It is based on the notion that "discourse" and "ideas" shape the world since, ultimately, history itself is the discursive journey ofthe Soul toward a cultural and spiritual resolution of material contradictions. This theory mystifies history by displacing "class" (labor) with "ideas" and "discourse," and it consequently produces world history as a "clash of civilizations" that rewrites the world in the interest of the Euroamerican capitalism (see Huntington). According to the clash theory (which is the most popular interpretive axis o f 9/ 11), people do what they do because of their "culture" not because they exploit the labor of others (and live in comfort), or because their labor is exploited by others (and therefore they live in abj ect poverty). The event, in other words, is an instance of the clash of civilizations: culture ("values," "language," "religion," the "affective") did it. "They" hate "our" way of life ("Their 'values' clash with our 'values"'). Since "values" are transhistorical, the clash is spiritual, not material. But culture, didn't do it. Contrary to contemporary dogma (seeHall,"Central- ity"), culture is not autonomous; it is the bearer of economic interests. Cultural values are, to be clear, inversive: they are a spiritualization of material interests. Culture cannot solve the contradictions that develop at the point of production; it merely suspends them. Material contradictions can be solved only materially - namely, by the class struggles that would end the global regime of wage labor. The event is an unfolding of a material contradiction not a clash of civilizations. If teaching the event does not at least raise the possibility of a class understanding of it, the teaching is not pedagogy; it is ideology (as I outline it later in this essay).

#### The logic of capitalism results in extinction through the creation of ecological catastrophe and violent imperialist wars that will turn nuclear

Foster 5 [John Bellamy, Monthly Review, September, Vol. 57, Issue 4, “Naked Imperialism”, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905jbf.htm>]

From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable for the system. Yet, ill-fated attempts by individual states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic. In present world circumstances, when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible. As the noted Marxian philosopher István Mészáros observed in Socialism or Barbarism? (2001)—written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: “[W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal.” The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction. These are symbolized by the Bush administration’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled “Apocalypse Soon” in the May–June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: “The United States has never endorsed the policy of ‘no first use,’ not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so.” The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fit—setting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other (representing approximately a quarter of the world’s total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the world’s growing environmental problems—raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue. The United States is seeking to exercise sovereign authority over the planet during a time of widening global crisis: economic stagnation, increasing polarization between the global rich and the global poor, weakening U.S. economic hegemony, growing nuclear threats, and deepening ecological decline. The result is a heightening of international instability. Other potential forces are emerging in the world, such as the European Community and China,that could eventually challenge U.S. power, regionally and even globally. Third world revolutions, far from ceasing, are beginning to gain momentum again, symbolized by Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution under Hugo Chávez. U.S. attempts to tighten its imperial grip on the Middle East and its oil have had to cope with a fierce, seemingly unstoppable, Iraqi resistance, generating conditions of imperial overstretch. With the United States brandishing its nuclear arsenal and refusing to support international agreements on the control of such weapons, nuclear proliferation is continuing. New nations, such as North Korea, are entering or can be expected soon to enter the “nuclear club.” Terrorist blowback from imperialist wars in the third world is now a well-recognized reality, generating rising fear of further terrorist attacks in New York, London, and elsewhere. Such vast and overlapping historical contradictions, rooted in the combined and uneven development of the global capitalist economy along with the U.S. drive for planetary domination, foreshadow what is potentially the most dangerous period in the history of imperialism. The course on which U.S and world capitalism is now headed points to global barbarism—or worse. Yet it is important to remember that nothing in the development of human history is inevitable. There still remains an alternative path—the global struggle for a humane, egalitarian, democratic, and sustainable society. The classic name for such a society is “socialism.” Such a renewed struggle for a world of substantive human equality must begin by addressing the system’s weakest link and at the same time the world’s most pressing needs—by organizing a global resistance movement against the new naked imperialism.

#### Vote negative to adopt the historical material criticism of the 1NC - historical analysis of the material conditions of capital is the only way to break free from is contradictions and social inequalities it causes

Tumino 1 (Steven, teaches at the City University of New York, Spring, What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before)

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### Class divisions are the root of all other oppressions

Kovel 2 (Alger Hiss Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, awarded Fellowship at the John Guggenheim Foundation, Joel, The Enemy of Nature, pages 123-124)

If, however, we ask the question of efficacy, that is, which split sets the others into motion, then priority would have to be given to class, for the plain reason that class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforce­ment and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of 'classism' to go along with 'sexism' and 'racism,' and `species-ism'). This is, first of all, because class is an essentially man-made category, without root in even a mystified biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender dis­tinctions – although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable – indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species' time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because 'class' signifies one side of a larger figure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state.'° Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of woman's labour. Class society continually generates gender, racial, ethnic oppressions and the like, which take on a life of their own, as well as profoundly affecting the concrete relations of class itself. It follows that class politics must be fought out in terms of all the active forms of social splitting. It is the management of these divisions that keeps state society functional. Thus though each person in a class society is reduced from what s/he can become, the varied reductions can be combined into the great stratified regimes of history — this one becoming a fierce warrior, that one a routine-loving clerk, another a submissive seamstress, and so on, until we reach today's personi­fications of capital and captains of industry. Yet no matter how functional a class society, the profundity of its ecological violence ensures a basic antagonism which drives history onward. History is the history of class society — because no matter how modified, so powerful a schism is bound to work itself through to the surface, provoke resistance (`class struggle'), and lead to the succession of powers. The relation of class can be mystified without end — only consider the extent to which religion exists for just this purpose, or watch a show glorifying the police on television — yet so long as we have any respect for human nature, we must recognize that so funda­mental an antagonism as would steal the vital force of one person for the enrichment of another cannot be conjured away.

#### Historical materialism must come first - it predetermines consciousness and the very possibilities of reflective thinking

**Marx 1859** (Karl, a pretty important dude. “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: Preface” http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm) JM

>edited for gendered language<

In the social production of their existence, [people] inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of [people] that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which [people] become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

### Case

#### Prioritizing epistemology reifies, rewards extremism and causes self-serving scholarship.

Lake, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California – San Diego, ‘11

[David, “Why ‘‘isms’’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress”, International Studies Quarterly, 2011, 55, 465-480, RSR]

The question of epistemology in international studies suffers from the same pathologies for theories outlined earlier, and which I need not repeat here. We reify each approach, reward extremism, fail to specify research designs completely, apply epistemologies selectively where they are most likely to work, and then claim universality. Through these pathologies, we not only create academic religions of different theories but also become committed to academic sects with different epistemologies. Like our theories, these epistemologies have become increasingly politicized and used as criteria and even weapons in power struggles within the discipline. Gatekeepers increasingly use one’s adherence to this or that epistemological religion to determine who gets hired where, who gets access to resources, and who is accepted in various professional networks. We increasingly talk and interact only with others of our same epistemological persuasion. Yet, although it may disappoint partisans, I can think of no objective reason to prefer one epistemology over another. Rather, the choice of epistemology by scholars appears to be largely subjective. We appear to be drawn to one or the other approach by intuition: one form of explanation simply feels right. Some are satisfied only when an event is placed in its full historical perspective with all the conjunctures and counterfactuals accounted for. Others are satisfied only when events accord with an appropriately derived hypothesis that has passed many demanding experimental tests. For myself, I read a lot in history—far more than I read in political science—and benefit from and enjoy these mostly narrative accounts immensely. But at the same time, I am usually not persuaded by causal claims that lack well-specified theories and experimental tests. In turn, while most of my own research has focused on the history of US foreign policy, the cases are treated within a nomological approach (see Lake 1988, 1999). One can move across the divide without finding the causal claims on the other side especially satisfying.

#### Their elevation of personal narrative over policy deliberation is politically dangerous—their strategy is the same used by the Bush administration to justify invading Iraq—only a model of public argument which emphasizes clear rules and empirical analysis can create a successful framework for progressive politics

Tonn 5 (Mari Boor, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland, College Park, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan "The Personal Is Political" to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational model's emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan's landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102 [End Page 423] The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues—models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as "elitist" or "monologic"—can be steep. Consider comments of an aide to President George W. Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, the primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives. Investigative reporters and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, he claimed, operate "in what we call the reality-based community." Such people "believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality." Then baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, he added: "That's not the way the world really works anymore . . . We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we'll act again, creating other new realities."103 The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse. Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, "A perennial embarrassment in liberal apologetics has arisen from its 'surgical' proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function." The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process, he writes, "is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts."104 Because public argument and deliberative processes are the "heart" of true democracy, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.

#### Their “polititcs of the body” is a strategy that reinforces a duality elevating the white mind. It justifies further oppression, turning case

Alley-Young 8 (July 2008, Gordon Alley-Young, Assistant Professor in the Department of Communications and Performing Arts at Kingsborough Community College-City University of New York, “Articulating Identity: Refining Postcolonial and Whiteness Perspectives on Race within Communication Studies,” The Review of Communication Vol. 8, No. 3, July 2008)

Descartes’ (1968) mind-body dichotomy holds that the body is divisible into its constitutive parts but that the mind is not. Postcolonial writers adapt Descartes’ (1968) dichotomy to explain how the colonial relationship situated whites and natives. In the postcolonial dichotomy white represents the mind and logic, perceiving natives as physical and illogical bodies requiring domination and control. Mohanram (1999, p. 15) cites claims of a ‘‘European universal subject’’ in colonial discourse. Such claims position white colonials as mobile, transportable, and logical as compared to the native person who is fixed to physical place and illogical. Such thinking allowed imperial nations to justify colonization as imposing logic and order on what they perceived to be illogical and underdeveloped people.¶ The postcolonial mind body dichotomy leaves the dimensions of the white body undeveloped. Dyer (1997, p. 6) describes experiencing his white body as ‘‘tightness, with self-control, self-consciousness, mind over body’’ when dancing among black bodies. Dyer’s (1997) comments suggest an experience of the white body that is informed by Cartesian thought. However, Dyer (1997) also seems to suggest that this white􏰀black physical difference is a reality, even if a socially constructed reality, while postcolonialism is suspect of such distinctions. Postcolonial writer Fanon (1967, p. 129) cites a frustrated friend who states, ‘‘When the whites feel that they have become too mechanized, they turn to the man of colour . . . for a little human sustenance.’’¶ In conflating whiteness with the mind this dichotomy suggests a rational, logical, and absent white body. The colonial perspective views the mind’s control over the white body as preferable to the body acting on its own physical impulses. The colonial perspective seeks to restrain, regulate, and/or educate the native body. The problem, Mohanram (1999) notes, is that the dichotomy reifies white colonialists’ belief that the white mind can develop but the black body cannot. This dichotomy negates native subjectivity by making natives physical bodies and thus objects that can be owned by the colonizer. Banton (2002) notes that, despite all the differences inherent in the colonial relationship, it was ‘‘complexion that came above all to serve as the sign of where a person belonged in the new social order’’ (p. 25). The black body became an object owned by this new social order. The dichotomy is a hierarchy but also a separation of subject from object.¶ One consequence of communicating about the native/black body as a physical object is that natives become hyper-sexualized (Mohanram, 1999) in the white imagination as sexually endowed (Dyer, 1997) and/or sexually violent (Fanon, 1967). Such myths reinforced colonizers’ resolve to control and restrict native bodies. This consequence surfaces in white, female colonists’ preoccupation with saving the native woman (Gandhi, 1998; Mohanram, 1999; Trinh, 1986/1987a, 1986/1987b). Colonial women perceived native men to be violent, oppressive tyrants and the native woman to be ignorant of their own oppression, thus requiring the help of enlightened, white, western women. This paternalistic thinking ignores native women’s strong cultural allegiances and views native culture as physically oppressive and needing western intervention.

#### In demanding a personal affirmation of narratives, the aff appropriates those narratives for selfish purposes that elevate the hegemonic expertise of the witness and recreate biopolitical control over the subject

Givoni 11 (Humanitarian Governance and Ethical Cultivation: Médecins sans Frontières and the Advent of the Expert-Witness Michal Givoni Department of Politics and Government, Ben Gurion University, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40(1) 43–63)

In order to gain a fuller understanding of humanitarian ethics it is therefore neces- sary to bring to light what Thomas Osborne has defined, following Michel Foucault, as ‘those practices, ideals, norms and techniques through which agents [in this case, the humanitarian rescuers] seek to “stylize” their attributes such as to make themselves coherent subjects of conduct’.8 In this vein, the notion of humanitarian ethics that I attempt to elaborate here does not refer to the imperatives and deliberations that seek to guide relief activity and ensure that it works to the benefit of the victims. It points, rather, to the modes in which humanitarian actors fashion their bodily, psychic and discursive behaviours so as to bring them into line with abstract norms and obligations. According to this perspective, ethics primarily consists of a cultivation of conduct, or what Foucault has famously called a ‘care of the self’, which frames both the exercise of freedom and the exercise of responsibility, aligning the experience of subjectivity with the govern- ment of the subject.9 In this sense, it is a style of life – to use a term put forward by Arnold Davidson – which constitutes the ‘matrix for ... moralities’, producing subjectivities that sustain and pre-conform to ethical precepts.10 By tracking the ethical work that lies at the roots of humanitarianism ‘without borders’, I wish to show that what Foucault has termed ‘technologies of the self’ have been pivotal to contemporary non-governmental humanitari- anism.11 This does not entail that the humanitarian endeavour is, in the final account, a purely narcissistic one. It rather means that the care exercised by experts for their own moral being has become increasingly enmeshed with their concern for others, forming the condition and the medium for the effective realisation of a contemporary politics of pity.12 The case of MSF makes it possible to trace the contours of one of the ethical supple- ments that became fused with professional practices of aid. For MSF, the burden of humanitarian dilemmas, when properly assumed, has been commingled with the figure of the witness. This figure, as I will show in what follows, had to be made and main- tained, while crafting physicians as vigilant observers of distant suffering and as compel- ling, rather than simply credible, spokespersons of victims worldwide. The humanitarian witness has been more than just a source of testimony whose own existence could be taken for granted: the witness has been a character to take on, an appealing moral posi- tion that could be attained by undertaking voluntary relief action in the Third World, and later deliberations and outspoken statements in Western public spheres. In Foucault’s terms, the witness has been the telos of varying modes of self-formation adopted by humanitarian practitioners.13 It has been the product of a sustained cultivation of indi- vidual and collective selves that, much like the care of the self in antiquity explored by Foucault, was not geared towards a hedonistic stylisation of character, but rather towards the surpassing of one’s bounded existence, inextricably merging the practitioners’ desti- nies with those of distant victims.14 In order to draw out the full resonance of the ethical practices that set witnessing as an end in itself it is necessary to turn our gaze back to the 1970s, when humanitarianism ‘without borders’ was only beginning to take shape. This period of incubation provides a privileged window into the making of a ‘specific intellectual’;15 a valuable historical record of how the figure of an engaged expert that came to constitute a new point of relay between truth and politics was forged in the field of medical humanitarianism.16 Yet MSF’s effort to weave together witnessing and medicine as a means to transcend the confines of the latter also casts critical light on this new intellectual project. It discloses the hitherto neglected connections of the expert-witness to a neo liberal political rational- ity that mobilises the freedom and autonomy of individuals as prime resources for the redeployment on a global scale of an efficacious political power. The recognition that in humanitarian work it is not only ‘impossible ... to distinguish altruism from narcissism’, as James Dawes has put it, but also potentially detrimental to do so has important repercussions for our appraisal of both the morality and the politics of humanitarianism.17 What need to be addressed are the affinities of the humanitarian endeavour with a configuration of political power in which, in the words of Foucault, ‘technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself and, conversely, ... [in which] techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion’.18 While the concern of critics of humanitarianism has focused largely on its alignment with sovereign biopolitics19 and with a discriminatory politics of life,20 there exists also a different kind of power game that renders this form of global benevolence politically problematic, albeit in a less deci- sive way. If the humanitarian administration of bare life is currently anchored in the ethi- cal cultivation of enlightened experts, if control over and surveillance of the unruly global peripheries is achieved not only through care for endangered populations but also through care for disconcerted selves, then there is a need to further complicate the picture drawn by the critical accounts of humanitarianism. This article makes a first step in this direction, using the study of the early years of MSF as a basis for a revised analytics of humanitarian power. Without presuming to argue that the case of MSF is representative of other humanitarian organisations, a claim that would require a far broader investiga- tion of the humanitarian field, I wish to show that the ethics of this prominent and influ- ential humanitarian actor shed light on the discrepancies within the contemporary apparatus of humanitarian governance and point to the need to revisit our conceptions of its mechanisms. Moving beyond the topos of bare life and its emphasis on the clinical and depoliticised framing of the suffering body in humanitarian practice, this article shows that the affinity between humanitarianism, medicine and politics draws, to a no lesser extent, on the ‘pursuit of enlightened subjectivity’ for which medicine has become ‘a privileged site’.21

#### Narratives support hegemonic structures- they link personal experience to universal unquestionable truth

Ewick and Silbey 95 (Patricia Susan S. Law & Society Review, 00239216, 19, Vol. 29, Issue 2)

In the previous section, we discussed how narratives, like the lives and experiences they recount, are cultural productions. Narratives are generated interactively through normatively structured performances and interactions. Even the most personal of narratives rely on and invoke collective narratives — symbols, linguistic formulations, structures, and vocabularies of motive — without which the personal would remain unintelligible and uninterpretable. Because of the conventionalized character of narrative, then, our stories are likely to express ideological effects and hegemonic assumptions.[ [10](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109#bib10)] We are as likely to be shackled by the stories we tell (or that are culturally available for our telling) as we are by the form of oppression they might seek to reveal. In short, the structure, the content, and the performance of stories as they are defined and regulated within social settings often articulate and reproduce existing ideologies and hegemonic relations of power and inequality. It is important to emphasize that narratives do more than simply reflect or express existing ideologies. Through their telling, our stories come to constitute the hegemony that in turn shapes social lives and conduct "The hegemonic is not simply a static body of ideas to which members of a culture are obliged to conform" (Silberstein 1988:127). Rather, Silberstein writes, hegemony has "a protean nature in which dominant relations are preserved while their manifestations remain highly flexible. The hegemonic must continually evolve so as to recuperate alternative hegemonies." In other words, the hegemonic gets produced and evolves within individual, seemingly unique, discrete personal narratives. Indeed, the resilience of ideologies and hegemony may derive from their articulation within personal stories. Finding expression and being refashioned within the stories of countless individuals may lead to a polyvocality that inoculates and protects the master narrative from critique. The hegemonic strength of a master narrative derives, Brinkley Messick (1988:657) writes, from "its textual, and lived heteroglossia … [, s]ubverting and dissimulating itself at every … turn"; thus ideologies that are encoded in particular stories are "effectively protected from sustained critique" by the fact that they are constituted through variety and contradiction. Research in a variety of social settings has demonstrated the hegemonic potential of narrative by illustrating how narratives can contribute to the reproduction of existing structures of meaning and power. First, narratives can function specifically as mechanisms of social control (Mumby 1993). At various levels of social organization — ranging from families to nation-states — storytelling instructs us about what is expected and warns us of the consequences of nonconformity. Oft-told family tales about lost fortunes or spoiled reputations enforce traditional definitions and values of family life (Langellier & Peterson 1993). Similarly, bureaucratic organizations exact compliance from members through the articulation of managerial prerogatives and expectations and the consequences of violation or challenge (Witten 1993). Through our narratives of courtship, lost accounts, and failed careers, cultures are constructed; we "do" family, we "do" organization, through the stories we tell (Langellier & Peterson 1993). Second, the hegemonic potential of narrative is further enhanced by narratives' ability to colonize consciousness. Well-plotted stories cohere by relating various (selectively appropriated) events and details into a temporally organized whole (see part I above). The coherent whole, that is, the configuration of events and characters arranged in believable plots, preempts alternative stories. The events seem to speak for themselves; the tale appears to tell itself. Ehrenhaus (1993) provides a poignant example of a cultural meta-narrative that operates to stifle alternatives. He describes the currently dominant cultural narrative regarding the United States's involvement in the Vietnam War as one that relies on themes of dysfunction and rehabilitation. The story, as Ehrenhaus summarizes it, is structured as a social drama which characterizes both the nation and individual Vietnam veterans as having experienced a breakdown in normal functioning only recently resolved through a process of healing. This narrative is persuasive because it reiterates and elaborates already existing and dominant metaphors and interpretive frameworks in American culture concerning what Philip Rieff (1968) called the "triumph of the therapeutic" (see also Crews 1994). Significantly, the therapeutic motif underwriting this narrative depicts veterans as emotionally and psychologically fragile and, thus, disqualifies them as creditable witnesses. The connection between what they saw and experienced while in Vietnam and what the nation did in Vietnam is severed. In other words, what could have developed as a powerful critique of warfare as national policy is contained through the image of illness and rehabilitation, an image in which "'healing' is privileged over 'purpose' [and] the rhetoric of recovery and reintegration subverts the emergence of rhetoric that seeks to examine the reasons that recovery is even necessary" (Ehrenhaus 1993:83). Constituent and distinctive features of narratives make them particularly potent forms of social control and ideological penetration and homogenization. In part, their potency derives from the fact that narratives put "forth powerful and persuasive truth claims — claims about appropriate behavior and values — that are shielded from testing or debate" (Witten 1993:105). Performative features of narrative such as repetition, vivid concrete details, particularity of characters, and coherence of plot silence epistemological challenges and often generate emotional identification and commitment. Because narratives make implicit rather than explicit claims regarding causality and truth as they are dramatized in particular events regarding specific characters, stories elude challenges, testing, or debate. Van Dijk (1993) has reported, for instance, that stories containing negative images and stereotypes of nonwhite persons are less subject to the charge of racism when they recount personal experiences and particular events. Whereas a general claim that a certain group is inferior or dangerous might be contested on empirical grounds, an individual story about being mugged, a story which includes an incidental reference to the nonwhite race of the assailant, communicates a similar message but under the protected guise of simply stating the "facts." The causal significance or relevance of the assailant's race is, in such a tale, strongly implied but not subject to challenge or efalsifiability. Thus representations, true and/or false, made implicitly without either validation or contest, are routinely exchanged in social interactions and thereby occupy social space. Third, narratives contribute to hegemony to the extent that they conceal the social organization of their production and plausibility. Narratives embody general understandings of the world that by their deployment and repetition come to constitute and sustain the life-world. Yet because narratives depict specific persons existing in particular social, physical, and historical locations, those general understandings often remain unacknowledged. By failing to make these manifest, narratives draw on unexamined assumptions and causal claims without displaying these assumptions and claims or laying them open to challenge or testing. Thus, as narratives depict understandings of particular persons and events, they reproduce, without exposing, the connections of the specific story and persons to the structure of relations and institutions that made the story plausible. To the extent that the hegemonic is "that order of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and epistemologies … that come to be taken-for-granted as the natural and received shape of the world and everything that inhabits it" (Comaroff & Comaroff 1991), the unarticulated and unexamined plausibility is the story's contribution to hegemony. The following two examples drawn from recent sociolegal research illustrate the ways in which legally organized narrativity helps produce the taken-for-granted and naturalized world by effacing the connections between the particular and the general. Sara Cobb (1992) examines the processes through which women's stories of violence are "domesticated" (tamed and normalized) within mediation sessions. Cobb reports that the domestication of women's stories of violence are a consequence of the organization of the setting in which they are told: within mediation, the storyteller and her audience are situated within a normative organization that recognizes the values of narrative participation over any substantive moral or epistemological code or standard. Being denied access to any external standards, the stories the women tell cannot therefore be adjudged true or compelling. The stories are interpreted as one version of a situation in which "multiple perspectives are possible." Cobb demonstrates how this particular context of elicitation specifically buries and silences stories of violence, effectively reproducing women's relative powerlessness within their families. With women deprived of the possibility of corroboration by the norms of the mediation session, their stories of violence are minimized and "disappeared." As a consequence, the individual woman can get little relief from the situation that brought her to mediation: she is denied an individual legal remedy (by being sent from court to mediation) and at the same time denied access to and connections with any collective understanding of or response to the sorts of violence acknowledged by the law (through the organization of the mediation process). Through this process, "violence, as a disruption of the moral order in a community, is made familiar (of the family) and natural — the extraordinary is tamed, drawn into the place where we eat, sleep and [is] made ordinary" (ibid., p. 19). Whereas mediation protects narratives from an interrogation of their truth claims, other, formal legal processes are deliberately organized to adjudicate truth claims. Yet even in these settings, certain types of truth claims are disqualified and thus shielded from examination and scrutiny. The strong preference of courts for individual narratives operates to impede the expression (and validation) of truth claims that are not easily represented through a particular story. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in the McClesky case (1986). The defendant, a black man who had been convicted of the murder of a police officer, was sentenced to death. His Supreme Court appeal of the death sentence was based on his claim that the law had been applied in a racially discriminatory way, thus denying him equal protection under the law. As part of McClesky's appeal, David Baldus, a social scientist, submitted an amicus brief in which he reported the results of his analysis of 2,000 homicide cases in that state (Baldus 1990). The statistical data revealed that black defendants convicted of killing white citizens were significantly more likely to receive the death sentence than white defendants convicted of killing a black victim. Despite this evidence of racial discrimination, the Court did not overturn McClesky's death sentence. The majority decision, in an opinion written by Justice Powell, stated that the kind of statistical evidence submitted by Baldus was simply not sufficient to establish that any racial discrimination occurred in this particular case. The court declared, instead, that to demonstrate racial discrimination, it would be necessary to establish that the jury, or the prosecutor, acted with discriminatory purpose in sentencing McClesky.[ [11](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109#bib11)] Here, then, an unambiguous pattern of racial inequity was sustained through the very invocation of and demand for subjectivity (the jury's or prosecutor's state of mind) and particularity (the refusal to interpret this case as part of a larger category of cases) that are often embodied in narratives. In this instance, relative powerlessness and injustice (if one is to believe Baldus's data) were preserved, rather than challenged, by the demand for a particular narrative about specific concrete individuals whose interactions were bounded in time and space. In other words, the Court held that the legally cognizable explanation of the defendant's conviction could not be a product of inferential or deductive comprehension (Mink 1970; Bruner 1986). Despite its best efforts, the defense was denied discursive access to the generalizing, and authoritative, language of social logico-deductive science and with it the type of "truths" it is capable of representing. The court insists on a narrative that effaces the relationship between the particular and the general, between this case and other capital trials in Georgia. Further, the McClesky decision illustrates not only how the demand for narrative particularity may reinscribe relative powerlessness by obscuring the connection between the individual case and larger patterns of institutional behavior; it also reveals how conventionalized legal procedures impede the demonstration of that connection.[ [12](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109#bib12)] The court simultaneously demanded evidence of the jurors' states of mind and excluded such evidence. Because jury deliberations are protected from routine scrutiny and evaluation, the majority demanded a kind of proof that is institutionally unavailable. Thus, in the McClesky decision, by insisting on a narrative of explicit articulated discrimination, the court calls for a kind of narrative truth that court procedures institutionally impede. As these examples suggest, a reliance on or demand for narrativity is neither unusual nor subversive within legal settings. In fact, given the ideological commitment to individualized justice and case-by-case processing that characterizes our legal system, narrative, relying as it often does on the language of the particular and subjective, may more often operate to sustain, rather than subvert, inequality and injustice. The law's insistent demand for personal narratives achieves a kind of radical individuation that disempowers the teller by effacing the connections among persons and the social organization of their experiences. This argument is borne out if we consider that being relieved of the necessity, and costs, of telling a story can be seen as liberatory and collectively empowering. Insofar as particular and subjective narratives reinforce a view of the world made up of autonomous individuals interacting only in immediate and local ways, they may hobble collective claims and solutions to social inequities (Silbey 1984). In fact, the progressive achievements of workers' compensation, no-fault divorce, no-fault auto insurance, strict liability, and some consumer protection regimes derive directly from the provision of legal remedies without the requirement to produce an individually crafted narrative of right and liability.

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### Cap K

#### Marxist epistemology is intextricably tied to Marxist praxis – knowledge is derived from observation of the material and action is based on this

Noebel 6 (doctorate from American Christian College, studied, philosophy in graduate school at the University of Wisconsin–Madison., selection from “Understanding the Times: The Collision of Today’s Competing Worldviews” (Rev. 2nd ed), David Noebel, Summit Press, 2006, http://www.allaboutworldview.org/marxist-philosophy.htm)

When it comes to Marxist philosophy, science plays a crucial role in the Marxist theory of knowledge. According to Lenin, “The fundamental characteristic of materialism arises from the objectivity of science, from the recognition of objective reality, reflected by science.”6 Marxist epistemology, like that of the Secular Humanists, places faith in the truth of science and denies all religious truth claims. Putting their faith in science as the infallible source of all knowledge logically follows from Marxist beliefs about reality. According to Lenin, “Perceptions give us correct impressions of things. We directly know objects themselves.”7 The objects Lenin speaks of are strictly material—“Matter is . . . the objective reality given to man in his sensations, a reality which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations.”8 In contrast, anything supernatural lacks objective, material reality, so according to Marxism we have no means of perceiving it or of gaining knowledge about it. Thus, Marxists deny the supernatural. They distinguish between knowledge of the material world and what they term true belief in an attempt to allow for scientific speculation while ignoring speculation about God. “What we call ‘knowledge’ must also be distinguished from ‘true belief.’ If, for example, there is life on Mars, the belief that there is life on Mars is true belief. But at the same time we certainly, as yet, know nothing of the matter. True belief only becomes knowledge when backed by some kind of investigation and evidence. Some of our beliefs may be true and others false, but we only start getting to know which are true and which are false when we undertake forms of systematic investigation. . . . For nothing can count as ‘knowledge’ except in so far as it has been properly tested.”9 Therefore, Marxist epistemology declares that we can never know belief in the supernatural as “true belief” because we cannot test it scientifically or empirically. We can determine as true beliefs only our speculations about the material world because only these can undergo systematic investigation. Thus, knowledge can apply only to the material world. Marxists believe that practice—testing knowledge throughout history—is also a valuable tool for gaining knowledge. We can test knowledge by applying it to our lives and society, and this application will eventually determine its truth or falsity. By examining history, we can determine which beliefs are true and which are not. Marxist epistemology is inextricably tied to Marxist dialectics. In fact, it is virtually impossible to separate Marxist materialism, dialectics, and epistemology. This is true largely because Marxists claim that dialectics operates in the place of metaphysics in their philosophy.¶ Marxist Philosophy – Conclusion Dialectical materialism, the philosophy of Marxism, contains an epistemology, a cosmology, an ontology, and an answer to the mind-body problem. For the Marxist, science and practice refine knowledge; the universe is infinite and all that will ever exist; matter is eternal and the ultimate substance; life is a product of this non-living matter; and the mind is a reflection of this material reality. But the Marxist philosophy embraces an even broader view of the world than is generally meant by the term philosophy. In truth, dialectical materialism is an entire method for viewing the world—it colors the Marxist perception of everything from ethics to history.

#### Their single-issue resistance provides a route for capitalism to co-opt their resistance – labor is the only issue that cannot be integrated and destroyed by capital

Meszaros 95 [Istavan, Prof. Emeritus at Sussex, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition] p. 40

To aggravate the situation, everything is further complicated by the fact that it is not feasible to find partial solutions to the problems that must be faced. Thus, no ‘single issue’ can be realistically considered a ‘single issue.’ If nothing else, this circumstance has been forcefully highlighted by the disconcerting marginalization of the Green movement on the success of which so much hope has been placed in recent times, even among former socialists. In the past up to a few decades ago it was possible to squeeze out of capital what appeared to be significant concessions—such as relative gains for the socialist movement (which later turned out to be reversible both as legislative measures for working class action and as gradually improving standard of living), obtained through the defensive organizations of labour: its trades unions and parliamentary parties. These gains could be conceded by capital so long as they could be assimilated and integrated by the system as a whole and turned to its productive advantage in the course of its self-expansion. Today, by contrast, confronting even partial issues with any hope of success implies the necessity of challenging the capital system as such. For in our own historical epoch, when productive self-expansion is no longer a readily available way out of the accumulating difficulties and contradictions (hence the purely wishful thinking of getting rid of the black hope of indebtedness by ‘growing out of it’), the global capital system of necessity frustrates all attempts at interfering even to a minimal extent with its structural parameters. In this respect the obstacles to be overcome are actually shared by labour—that is, labour as the radical alternative to capital’s social metabolic order—and the ‘single issue’ movements. For the historic failure of social democracy clearly underlined that only integrable demands can gain legitimacy under the rule of capital. Environmentalism by its very nature—just like the great historic cause of women’s liberation—is non-integrable. Consequently no such cause will for the capital system conveniently fade way, irrespective of how many setbacks and defeats the politically organized forms of ‘single issue’ movements might have to suffer in the foreseeable future. However, historically/epochally defined non-integrability, no matter how important for the future, cannot guarantee success on its own. Switching the allegiance of disappointed socialists from the working class to so-called ‘new social movements’ (praised now in opposition to, and by discarding altogether the emancipatory potential of, labour) must be considered, therefore, far too premature and naive. Single issue movements, even if they fight for non-integrable causes, can be picked off and marginalized one by one, because they cannot lay claim to representing a coherent and comprehensive alternative to the given order as a mode of social metabolic control and system of societal reproduction. This is what makes focusing on the socialist emancipatory potential of labour more important today than ever before. For labour is not only non-integrable (in contrast to some historically specific political manifestations of labour, like reformist social democracy, which may be rightly characterized as integrable and indeed in the last few decades also completely integrated), but — precisely as the only feasible structural alternative to capital — can provide the comprehensive strategic framework within which all ‘single issue’ emancipatory movements can successfully make their common cause for the survival of humanity.

#### You cannot permute a method – it strips out all of the conceptual theory that allows us both understand the world and to create a praxis to end oppression

Tumino 1 [Stephen, Prof English at Pitt, ““What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

#### Ethics DA – We have ethical obligation to repudiate capitalism – this means any risk a link is a reason to reject the permutation

Marsh 95 (James, Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, “Critique, Action, Liberation” p. 334-335)

An example from the sphere of personal morality should make the difference clear. When a friend, relative, teacher, or minister counsels an alcoholic to confront her habit, she is not making a prediction. Indeed it may seem unlikely, given this particular person’s past history, that she will lick her habit. Nonetheless, the moral obligation to get over her habit remains. Similarly, an obligation exists to get over **our** capitalism as a social equivalent of drunkenness. If the argument of this chapter is correct, we cannot renounce such an attempt at transcendence without giving up on the ethical project or curtailing that project by confining it to the sphere of intimate, interpersonal relations**.** I am a good father or husband or lover in my private life, but i remain exploitative, cruel, and inhumane in my public, capitalistic life. Such ethical renunciation or curtailment is the death or mutilation of the human; denial of utopia is a living death. Ideologies of scientific elitism, therefore, as they function in capitalist society are correct if there is no such thing as ethical, constitutive reason operating in community**.** If such constitutive reason is possible and actual in human beings as human in community, then scientific elitism is false. Men and women acting democratically and participatively do have a capacity to understand themselves and their lives in a way that is cogent and in touch with reality. Indeed, many of the popular movements in Europe, England, and the United States in the last twenty years such as feminism, environmentalism, civil rights, and antiwar movements, often acting against the advice or opinion of experts have shown themselves to be right and effective. In the Vietnam War, for example, millions of people in the united states taking to the streets in protest proved the “best and the brightest” in the white house, pentagon, and state department wrong. The “best and the brightest” according to the standards of scientific elitism proved to be deluded. The presence of an ethical, political rationality in all of us as human invalidates scientific elitism at its core. As I am arguing it here, a fundamental link exists among dialectical phenomenology, ethical, constitutive rationality, and democracy. Philosophy and ethics, properly understood, are antielitist. To think in a utopian manner, then, about community and socialism is to free ourselves from the excessive hold that science and technology exert over our minds and imaginations. We begin to see that science and technology and expertise, even though they are legitimate within their proper domains, do not exhaust or monopolize the definition of reason and other forms of reason and knowledge that are more informative, profound, and fundamental, indeed, compared to certain expressions of art or ethics or philosophy or religion, science and technology are relatively superficial**.** What revelatory power does a scientific equation have compared to Hamlet’s “to be or not to be” speech? What does an empirical of human populations show me about human life compared to the insight of Marx’s capital? What can a factual study of war show about its horrors compared to Picasso’s Guernica? To the extend, therefore, that science and technology dominate in the twentieth century as not only the highest forms of reason by the only forms of reason, they shove other, more profound, more reflective, more fundamental forms of reason to the side and twentieth-century industrial society emerges as an inverted, topsy-turvy, absurd world. What seems normal, factural, rational, and sane in such a world is in fact abnormal, apparent, irrational, and absurd. We begin to suspect and see that science and technology appear as the highest and only forms of reason because capitalism has appropriated science and technology for its own ends as productive force and ideology. In science and technology capitalism has found the forms of rationality most appropriate for itself, perfectly manifesting it, mirroring it, and justifying it. In such an absurd, inverted topsy-turvy world, fidelity to the life of reason demands critique, resistance, and revolutionary transcendence. One has to pierce the veil of such a world, see through it as absurd rather than accepting it as normal and sane. The prevailing rationality is profoundly irrational.

#### Embracing “experience” as the basis for epistemology ignores the mediated nature of experience. Experience is just another site for articulating the dominant ideology because it ignores the historical continuity of class domination in favor of a “local” understanding of oppression.

Young 6 (Robert, Red Critique, Winter/Spring, “Putting Materialism back into Race Theory”, <http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/puttingmaterialismbackintoracetheory.htm>)

Bourgeois philosophical assumptions haunt the Afrocentric project and, in the domain of black feminist theory, Patricia Hill Collins provides an instructive example of this intersection. In Black Feminist Thought, Collins posits the "special angle of vision" that black women bring to knowledge production process (21), and this "unique angle" (22) provides the "standpoint" for Afrocentric feminism, a feminism that she equates with humanism (37). Similar to the experiential metaphysics of Black women's standpoint theory, Collins also situates Afrocentric feminist epistemology "in the everyday experiences of African-American women" (207). Consequently, Collins suggests that "concrete experience" constitutes a criterion of meaning (208). However, the experiential, the "real", does not adequate the "truth", as Collins implies. Collins rejects the "Eurocentric Masculinist Knowlege Validation Process" for its positivism but, in turn, she offers empiricism as the grounds for validating experience. Hence, the validity of experiential claims is adjudicated by reference to the experience. Not only is her argument circular, but it also undermines one of her key claims. If race, class, gender, and the accompanying ideological apparatuses are interlocking systems of oppression, as Collins suggest, then the experiential is not the site for the "true" but rather the site for the articulation of dominant ideology. On what basis then, could the experiential provide grounds for an historical understanding of the structures that make experience itself possible as experience? Asante and Collins assume that experience is self-intelligible and in their discourse it functions as the limit text of the real. However, I believe experience is a highly mediated frame of understanding. Though it is true that a person of color experiences oppression, this experience is not self-explanatory and, therefore, it needs to be situated in relation to other social practices. Experience seems local but it is, like all cultural and political practices, interrelated to other practices and experiences. Thus its explanation come from its "outside". Theory, specifically Marxist theory, provides an explanation of this outside by reading the meaning of all experiences as determined by the economic realities of class. While Asante's and Collins' humanism reads the experience of race as a site of "self-presence", the history of race in the United States—from slavery to Jim Crow to Katrina—is written in the fundamental difference of class. In other words, experience does not speak the real, but rather it is the site of contradictions and, hence, in need of conceptual elaboration to break from cultural common sense, a conduit for dominant ideology. It is this outside that has come under attack by black (humanist) scholars through the invocation of the black (transcendental) subject.

#### Subjectivity subverts the anti-capitalist struggle – it is only from the objective material facts of class that the exploitation of labor can be explained and undermined

Zavarzadeh 3 (Mas’ud, “The Pedagogy of Totality” p.23-25, in “JAC: A Journal of Rhetoric, Culture, and Politics”, Volume 23.1, http://www.jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol23.1.html)

Objectivity is not writing (epistemology); it is the very structure of reality, which is another way of saying it is ontological. Bourgeois pedagogy, in an ideological maneuver concealed as a philosophical questioning of positivism, reduces the ontological to the epistemological and then deconstructs the epistemological as an effect of textual displacement and, in doing so, denies the existence of an objective reality. Idealist pedagogy, which is a theoretical arm of the ruling class, has always opposed the objective and objectivity in order to elevate the theological and the speculative and thus foster illusion in the mind of students - future workers. Positivism, which has ruthlessly opposed the theological and the metaphysical since the height of capitalist pedagogical theory in the nineteenth century, has been the target of unrelenting attacks by bourgeois radical pedagogy. The most recent assaults against positivism are mounted by post-al writings (poststructuralism, postmarxism, postcolonialism, postmodemism), which disperse the objective in the play of errant tropes (Derrida), in hegemonic consensus (Laclau and Mouffe), and in cultural affect (Hall). As my arguments for privileging the conceptual, the non-observable structures of the "working day" (exploitation), the critique-aI, and anti-instrumental teaching (that is, against teaching as "skills" training) demonstrate, the pedagogy of totality is antipositivist. Even though positivism has fought theological and metaphysical speculations, which are always spaces in which class interests lurk, it is, as a philosophical movement, subjectivist and antimaterialist (see Lenin, Materialism). The antimaterialism of positivism is now recirculated, with an antipositivist rhetoric, in the neopositivist theories of post-aI pedagogies from poststructualism (Derrida's corpo- real textualism) and neo-Gramscian postmarxism (Lac1au and Mouffe's empiricist hegemonism) to articulatory cultural theory (Hall's actualist analyses). The pedagogy of totality demonstrates the anti-critique-al instrumentalism of these neopositivist pedagogies by foregroundingtheir teaching strategies which erase the why of critique-al teaching and substitute for it the how oftechne. Derrida, Laclau and Mouffe, and Hall are exemplary of the new pedagogues who, following positivist tendencies, deny concept, abstractions, and laws of motion and instead found their practices on the sense-able (that is, the sensuous and the observable), on rhetorical instantism and, above all, on semiotic physics to assert the singular and, as in all positivism, cancel the universal. Objectivity is produced by human practice, the basis of which is labor-material production. To be more clear, objectivity is the outcome of "social metabolism, "the dialectical relation of labor and nature (Marx, Capital 1, 198). By "dialectical," I do not mean "two-way," "hybrid" and! or "multifaceted"-as Euroamerican marxists do. Rather, I use the concept as "the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects" (Lenin, "Conspectus" 251-52). Contradictions, class struggles, the law of value, and social and economic crisis, which form the foundation of all contemporary social practices, are not epistemological. Rather, they are the fundamental structure of reality under wage labor. In other words, as humans produce their material1ife through their labor, they produce the objective (world). In producing their material1ife, to be precise, humans "enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will" (Marx, Capital 21). The subject of transformative pedagogy is the structure of these objective relations (that underlie knowledges), which are produced by humans but are independent from their consciousness, since "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness"(22).The pedagogy of totality is both objective and emancipatory it is emancipatory because it is objective: "[K]nowledge which cannot be regarded as objective is powerless or useless.... The practices relying on such pseudo-knowledge are adventurist and even harmful. Failing to meet the requirement of objectivity, they are bound to become arbitrary" (Naletov 139). The eradication of the objective is always and ultimately an economic act: I t is part ofthe class struggles ofour time over the surplus labor ofthe global proletariat. By obscuring the objective, for instance, triumphalist neoliberalism has effectively marginalized (objective) labor, which is the source o f social wealth (and thus o f science) and instead has valorized the (subjective) consciousness as producer ofwealth (knowledge), as in the concept of "knowledge capitalism." The fact that the "subjective" is itself an accumulation of many objectivities - it is produced in the production of material life-is concealed by the theological theories of the autonomy of consciousness popularized by such writers as Jacques Lacan, Emmanuel Levinas, and the recirculation of Bergsonian theosophy in the religious writings of Deleuze, Guattari, and new feminist theosophers such as Elizabeth Grosz. The pedagogy of totality, through class critique, unpacks the theo-semiotics of consciousness-as-excess that now dominates radical bourgeois pedagogy. To focus on individual consciousness and language instead of the objective world is to mis-educate people by teaching them the textual strategies of deep fantasizing about themselves and their place in the world-as-is instead of the knowledge that enables them to act on the world. In the end, this lesson only naturalizes wage labor and the fantasizers' subservient position in it. As the objective economic reality of wage-labor produces wealth for the transnational bourgeoisie and brings misery and daily alienation to the rest ofpeople, students who are taught by the pedagogy of the affective that objectivity is a language fiction, learn to compensate for their abjection through retreating into deep cultural dreaming and consuming popular culture, which like the pedagogy of affect manufactures mass fantasies. To teach for human emancipation, pedagogy has to abandon the fetish of consciousness and language so that it can re-ground itself in the objective reality of human labor.

## 1NR

### Case

#### Their methodology will be normed by dominant structures.

Ilan Gur-Ze’ev Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, Israel 1998 “Toward a Non-Repressive Critical Pedagogy,” http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ilangz/Critpe39.html

**Giroux constructs an original synthesis of the Enlightenment’s universalistic commitment to liberate the repressed and a rejection of the concepts as the universality of reason, the validity of a general theory, and resistance of constructions and dynamics that are to be reconstructed and negated, even if not defeated or domesticated.** Today Giroux accepts the postmodern understanding of the plurality and inconsistancy of time fields, the different epistemological structure of different communities, and the legitimacy of political and epistemic difference; yet **he still insists on the possibilities of emancipation here and now.** Implicitly, in his thought these possibilities for emancipation are actual and universal, and his positive utopianism and his new epistemic assumptions are inconsistance. **Here arise violent potentialities of his concept of dialogue between teachers and students. He has not found a theoretical solution to the conflict between the authority of the self-evidence knowledge, criteria, goals, and interests of individual students of repressed collectives and the principles of** his own **Critical Pedagogy. While paying tribute to the self-evident knowledge of popular culture and criticizing elitist culture** and Critical Theory, **his own theory is elitist, sophisticated, and far from the reflective reach of those normalized and manipulated by popular culture and other manifestations of culture industry**.(43) It is a typical representative of both feminist and “patriarchal” Critical Pedagogy.(44) Acknowledgment of difference as the foundation of the “language of possibilities” may justify the optimism and positive utopianism of such a Critical Pedagogy. Yet it guarantees that this critique will not contemplate deeply and problematize the roots of existence and co-existence and question the possibilities of reality, but will realize its potential for philosophical violence and political terror. Giroux combines two salient elements that guarantee the political success of his Critical Postmodern Pedagogy. He ignores Critical Theory’s exposition of the systematic destruction of the individual’s potential for autonomy and reflectivity (45) and neglects their exposition of the disappearance of Spirit (46) and the exile of reason which was replaces by instrumental rationality. In his work Giroux combines these two neglections with negligence of a central postmodern position: the relation between knowledge and power. This last move allows him to disregard postmodern critique of “truth” claims of the intellectual as well as the emancipatory movement that “succeeds” in “liberating” individuals and collectives. **The very concept of the “we”, the “community”, as a manifestation of the violence of education that constitutes the self-evidence and the identity of both the oppressors and the oppressed stays non-problematic and is presented uncritically in this Critical Pedagogy. Exactly where he could use postmodernist understandings to reformulate some problematic modernist elements in his pedagogical ambitions, Giroux uses some of the most dangerous concepts. His concept of dialogue and alternative relations between teachers as intellectuals and students is based on modernistic attitudes towards voluntarism and vitalism, but there is no defined concept of reason; this is philosophically and politically very dangerous.**

#### Obsession with White Supremacy is bad – white racists have mastered that game. The result of their project is to reinscribe whites as the principal point of reference.

West, ultimate badass, 1993 [Cornel, Race Matters, p. 98-99]

**The project of black separatism** -- to which Malcolm X was beholden for most of his life after his first psychic conversion to the Nation of Islam -- **suffered from deep intellectual and organizational problems**. Unlike Malcolm X's notion of psychic conversion, Elijah **Muhammad's idea of religious conversion was predicated on an obsession with white supremacy. The basic aim of black Muslim theology** -- with its distinct black supremacist account of the origins of white people -- **was to counter white supremacy**. **Yet this** preoccupation with white supremacy **still allowed** white people **to serve as the** principal point of reference**. That which fundamentally motivates one still dictates the terms of what one thinks and does** -- **so the motivation of a black supremacist doctrine reveals how obsessed one is with white supremacy. This is understandable** in a white racist society -- **but it is crippling for a despised people struggling for freedom, in that** one's eyes should be on the prize, not **on the perpetuator of one's oppression. In short**, Elijah **Muhammad's project remained captive to the supremacy game** -- **a game mastered by the white racists he opposed and imitated with his black supremacy doctrine**.

#### Their narratives of suffering produce flawed knowledge about the other and exclude those whose narratives aren’t about suffering, turning case

Brown 96 (Wendy is Professor of Women's Studies and Legal Studies, and is Co-Director of the Center for Cultural Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable)

If, taken together, the two passages from Foucault we have been consider- ing call feminists to account in our compulsion to put everything about women into discourse, they do not yet exhaust the phenomenon of being ensnared 'in the folds of our own discourses.' For if the problem I have been discussing is easy enough to see--indeed, largely familiar to those who track techniques of co-optation--at the level of legal and bureaucratic discourse, **it is altogether more disquieting when it takes the form of regulatory discourse in our own sub- and counter-cultures of resistance . . . when confessing injury becomes that which attaches us to the injury, paralyzes us within it, and prevents us from seeking or even desiring a status other than injured.** In an age of social identification through attributes marked as culturally significant--gender, race, sexuality, and so forth--**confessional discourse, with its truth-bearing status in a post-epistemological universe, not only regulates the confessor in the name of freeing her** as Foucault described that logic, but extends beyond the confess- ing individual to constitute a regulatory truth about the identity group. **Confessed truths are assembled and deployed as "knowledge" about the group.** This phenomenon would seem to undergird a range of recurring troubles in feminism, from the "real woman" rejoinder to post-structuralist deconstructions of her, to totalizing descriptions of women's experience that are the inadvertent effects of various kinds of survivor stories. Thus, for example, the porn star who feels miserably exploited, violated and humiliated in her work invariably monopolizes the truth about sex work; as the girl with math anxieties constitutes the truth about women and math; as eating disor- ders have become the truth about women and food; as sexual abuse and viola- tion occupy the knowledge terrain of women and sexuality. In other words, even as feminism aims to affirm diversity among women and women's ex- periences, confession as the site of production of truth and its convergence with feminist suspicion and deauthorization of truth from other sources tends to reinstate a unified discourse in which the story of greatest suffering becomes the true story of woman. (I think this constitutes part of the rhetorical power of MacKinnon's work; analytically, the epistemological superiority of confes- sion substitutes for the older, largely discredited charge of false consciousness). Thus, the adult who does not suffer from her or his childhood sexual experi- ence, the lesbian who does not feel shame, the woman of color who does not primarily or "correctly" identify with her marking as such--these figures are excluded as bonafide members of the categories which also claim them. Their status within these discourses is that of being "in denial," "passing" or being a "race traitor." **This is the norm-making process in feminist traditions of "breaking silence" which, ironically, silence and exclude the very women these traditions mean to empower.** (Is it surprising, when we think in this vein, that there is so little feminist writing on heterosexual pleasure?) But **if these practices tacitly silence those whose experiences do not parallel those whose suffering is most marked** (or whom the discourse produces as suffering markedly), **they also condemn those whose sufferings they record to a** permanent identification **with that suffering**. Here, **we experience a temporal ensnaring in 'the folds of our own discourses' insofar as we identify ourselves in speech in a manner that condemns us to live in a present dominated by the past.** But what if speech and silence aren't really opposites? Indeed, **what if to speak incessantly of** one's **suffering is to silence the possibilities of overcoming it,** of living beyond it, of identifying as something other than it? **What if this incessant speech not only overwhelms the experiences of others, but alternative** (unutterable? traumatized? fragmentary? inassimilable?) **zones of one's own experience**? Conversely, what if a certain modality of silence about one's suffering--and I am suggesting that we must consider modalities of silence as varied as modalities of speech and discourse--is to articulate a variety of possibilities not otherwise available to the sufferer?

#### Debate exacerbates these problems: the ballot commodifies identities and arranges them according to the most “authentic” experiences of suffering and cultural identity.

Bowman 2010 [Paul, professor of cultural studies at Cardiff University. “INTRODUCTION

Rey Chow and postcolonial social semiotics,” *Social Semiotics* 20.4]

A confession: a predictable confession. Part of me feels like a joke, a fraud, a fake, a phoney. A white British guy, with qualifications and a job, in Britain, about to write, as if authoritatively, about ‘‘postcolonialism’’ (a title that I myself chose I did not have to choose it, but I did): I feel a bit odd, to say the least. Perhaps for this reason, when thinking of how to proceed and of what to write, I got a tune stuck in my head a single line in a constant loop, replaying in my head, a single interminably repeated phrase an ear-worm which I took to be a crystal clear message on the royal road from my unconscious to my superego. It was a line from a song by the American pop/punk band, The Offspring. It was: ‘‘and all the girlies say I’m pretty fly for a white guy’’. The music video for this song, ‘‘Pretty Fly for a White Guy’’ (The Offspring 1998), can of course always be found on YouTube, even if its URL keeps changing. Even a cursory viewing of the video reveals that, in the music video, the words ‘‘all the girlies say I’m pretty fly for a white guy’’ are uttered by a stereotypical white ‘‘wannabe’’. The lyrics narrate the tale or rather, the situation the plight of an apparently affluent, suburban white American teenager who fetishizes and fantasizes about edgy non-white ethnicity. In the video, we see several of the scenarios that define his phantasy.1 Whether black African-American or Latino, our eponymous ‘‘white guy’’ wannabe wants-to-be that: he identifies with, he fantasizes as that. He wants to be one of them. Unfortunately, what is absolutely clear here is that the one thing he is not is ‘‘pretty fly’’. Rather, he is presented as ridiculous, a fool, utterly lacking in self-awareness or self-knowledge living, as the lyrics put it, ‘‘in denial’’. So, the song is all about getting it wrong, wanting the impossible, and denying that impossibility. The reason for wanting the impossible boils down to a phantasy. This is dramatized in the call-and-response (and commentary) that opens and permeates the song. The song opens with it: a female chorus chant ‘‘Give it to me baby’’. In the video, our hapless hero responds in the affirmative. This call and response is repeated. It is a chant of female call and male response that dramatizes what is evidently a male sexual phantasy about specifically ethnic female desire. It is followed by the gravelly-voiced claim: ‘‘And all the girlies say I’m pretty fly for a white guy’’, whereupon the song ‘‘proper’’ begins. This, it soon becomes clear, is the structuring fantasy of our misrecognizing, fantasizing white guy. This is what he wants. This is what he thinks it would be like if only he were the ethnic he wants to be. This is what he wants to see and hear. He imagines the call. He ‘‘performs’’ (as they say) a response. So, in the video representation, the song runs: repeated female chant (‘‘Give it to me baby’’); he answers (‘‘uh huh, uh huh’’). This is followed by the voice of his phantasy, which asserts his conviction that ‘‘all the girlies say I’m pretty fly for a white guy’’. After this intro, we are ‘‘counted-in’’ in incorrect Spanish (‘‘Uno, dos, tres, cuatro, cinco, cinco, seis’’). If we had been in any doubt up until now, this miscount this moment of getting it just a bit but fundamentally wrong not quite getting the Spanish right clarifies things for us. This is a joke. This is about misrecognition, getting it wrong. Moreover, the girls in the video are clearly non-existent fantasy constructions: there never were girls thronging around him on the way to his car, by the side of the road, or covered in glittering paint by the pool. They are entirely his phantasy. An initial assessment of the song, taking into account any mirth it might produce and the extent to which we might share, understand, or ‘‘get’’ the joke suggests that this popular cultural text is saying something quite precise about identity, ‘‘cultural’’ identity, ‘‘identity performativity’’ and ethnicity. And this appears to be something quite different from what is widely supposed to be held by many thinkers, from Judith Butler to Homi Bhabha and beyond. For, the text is saying at least one, or perhaps all, of the following: that a white ethnic cannot or should not try to ‘‘perform’’ another ethnic identity; that trying to be other than white for the white is ridiculous; that trying to do or to be so is premised on ‘‘not getting it’’, on ‘‘denial’’; that white ethnicity is not like other ethnicities not porous, not dilutable, not ‘‘hybridisable’’ or ‘‘fragile’’; and that the only compensation for the sadness and disappointment that this might cause for our wannabe is the contemporary Confessional: ‘‘At least you know you can always go on Ricki Lake’’. Indeed, do not worry, be happy, add The Offspring: ‘‘the world needs wannabes’’. So, ‘‘hey, hey, do the brand new thing’’. The song is very clear on this. After staging the fantasy scenario, after being miscounted-in, the narrative voice begins to tell us all about it. The lyrics begin by addressing us in terms of a shared lot, a common problem that we all recognize: 330 P. Bowman ‘‘You know it’s kinda hard just to get along today’’. We all know this, right? Furthermore: ‘‘Our subject isn’t cool, but he thinks it anyway’’. Is this not a familiar story? How many of us are guilty of it ourselves? We may recall Lacan’s contention that, in love, ‘‘You never look at me from the place from which I see you. Conversely, what I look at is never what I wish to see’’ (Lacan, quoted in Chow 1998, 81). Moreover, as Rey Chow points out, this ‘‘dialectic of eye and gaze’’ need not be literally intersubjective; a man may fall ‘‘in love, not with a woman or even with another man, not with a human being at all but with a thing, a reified form of his own fantasy’’ (1998, 78). As The Offspring put it: ‘‘He may not have a clue, and he may not have style/But everything he lacks, well he makes up in denial’’. Is this his problem: ‘‘denial’’? ‘‘Denial’’ is surely the most abused, misused, bandied-about psychobabblistic term ever. Everyone, it seems risks living in denial. Overcoming denial is indeed an abiding concern of an enormous range of popular cultural texts and discourses. But, if denial is deemed to be the problem, what is deemed to be the solution? The popular answer is: come to terms, recognize, accept. But how? By talking about yourself; by confessing. Go on Ricki Lake. Even if you are ‘‘fake’’, you can have a moment of real-world, recognized, ‘‘authentic’’ success (‘‘fame’’), by coming clean, by confessing, publicly: the only authentic redemption in a world that thrives on the production of fakes and wannabes, say The Offspring. If we can laugh at all of this it is also because we can recognize all of this. According to the implications of the argument of Michel Foucault (1978) in The history of sexuality, volume 1, this familiarity and recognizability comes from the fact that The Offspring song plays with the material thrown up by and circulating in and as a discursive constellation a very old discursive constellation, says Foucault, which came together in the eighteenth century. In this discursive formation, the terms ethnicity, identity, authenticity and autobiography or confession encounter each other in an overdetermined chiasmus. In it, whenever issues of identity and ethnicity arise as a (self-reflexive, ‘‘personal’’) problem, this discursive constellation proposes that the route out is via the self-reflexive side-door of autobiographical (self-)confession. There is more to this than observing that engaging with ethnicity requires an engagement with one’s own identity, one that ought to lead into a searching self-interrogation and ideally a deconstruction of questions of authenticity and autobiography although this is certainly a part of it. For the Foucauldian point is that precisely such discourses of the self, especially in terms of the brands of self-referentiality that nowadays feed chat shows like Ricki Lake, can be seen to have emerged decisively in modernity. And they emerged with an attending argument about self-referentiality’s subversive relation to power and its emancipatory relation to truth. That is, it refers us to the implications of Foucault’s argument about what he called ‘‘the repressive hypothesis’’ namely, that almost irresistible belief that power tries to silence us and demands our silence (Foucault 1978, 18; Chow 2002, 114). As Foucault argued, however, almost the exact opposite is the case. Or rather, even if there are places where power demands silence or discipline, these are more than matched by an exponential explosion and proliferation of discourses in this case, about the self. These discourses include arguments about self-referentiality’s subversive relation to power and its emancipatory relation to truth, which relates to the Enlightenment idea that an introspective turn to the self is emancipatory: the ingrained idea (whose prehistory is the Catholic Confessional, and whose contemporary ministers Foucault finds in the psychiatrist and psychoanalyst) that seeking to speak the truth of oneself is the best method of getting at our essential truth and the best way to resist power. Similarly, modern literary self-referentiality emerged with an attending discourse of resistance a discourse that regarded literature ‘‘as such’’ as resistance to the instrumentalization of technical and bureaucratic language, first and foremost. And, by the same token, self-referentiality emerged as an apparently ideal solution to the knotty problem of representing others. For, how do you represent others truthfully, adequately, ethically? The answer here is: you do not. They should represent themselves. Here, the self-reflexivity of self-referentiality is regarded not as apartheid but as the way to bypass the problems of representing others by throwing the option open for everyone to speak the truth of themselves. However, in Foucault’s phrase: ‘‘the ‘Enlightenment’, which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines’’ (Foucault 1995, 222; see also Chow 1998, 113). In other words, the desire to refer to the self, to discuss the self, to produce the self discursively, § Marked 14:17 § the impulse to autobiography and confession, can be regarded as a consequence of disciplinarity. Psychiatry demands that we reveal our selves. As does psychoanalysis, as do ethnographic focus groups, as do corporate marketing focus groups, not to mention the Confessional, the criminologist and Ricki Lake. And so on. Autobiography and confession are only resistance if power truly tries to repress the production of discourse. Which it does not at least not everywhere. The point is that autobiography and confession are genealogically wedded if not welded to recognizable disciplinary protocols and perhaps most significantly proceed according to the terms of recognizable metanarratives. Thus, says Chow: When minority individuals think that, by referring to themselves, they are liberating themselves from the powers that subordinate them, they may actually be allowing such powers to work in the most intimate fashion from within their hearts and souls, in a kind of voluntary surrender that is, in the end, fully complicit with the guilty verdict that has been declared on them socially long before they speak. (Chow 2002, 115) Of course, in thinking about postcoloniality, ethnicity, social semiotics and cultural politics, it is very difficult not to think about oneself. Indeed, even in full knowledge of Foucault, there remains something of a complex imperative to do so, even (perhaps especially) if, like me, one does not have a blatantly postcolonial ethnicity in the classic sense even if, that is, like me, one has an entirely hegemonic sociocultural identity: an ethnicity without ethnicity, as it were; the hegemon of a hegemony; that is, the ‘‘norm’’. For, surely, one must factor oneself into whatever picture one is painting, in terms of the ‘‘institutional investments that shape [our own] enunciation’’ (Chow 1993, 2). Indeed, suggests Chow: the most difficult questions surrounding the demarcation of boundaries implied by ‘‘seeing’’ have to do not with positivistic taxonomic juxtapositions of self-contained identities and traditions in the manner of ‘‘this is you’’ and ‘‘that is us,’’ but rather, who is ‘‘seeing’’ whom, and how? What are the power relationships between the ‘‘subject’’ and ‘‘object’’ of the culturally overdetermined ‘‘eye’’? (Chow 1991: 3) 332 P. Bowman Might acknowledging as much make me pretty fly for a white guy? As thinkers like Robyn Wiegman and Rey Chow have pointed out: the white subject who nowadays endeavors to compensate for the historical ‘‘wrong’’ of being white by taking on politically correct agendas (such as desegregation) and thus distancing himself from his own ethnic history, is seldom if ever accused of being disloyal to his culture; more often than not, he tends to be applauded for being politically progressive and morally superior. (Chow 2002, 116117) Chow proposes that we compare and contrast this with non-white ethnic subjects or rather, in her discussion, with non-white ethnic critics, scholars and academics. These subjects, she argues are pressured directly and indirectly to behave ‘‘properly’’ to act and think and ‘‘be’’ the way ‘‘they’’ are supposed to act and think and be, as non-white ethnic academic subjects. If they forget their ethnicity, or their nationalistically or geographically and hence essentialistically and positivistically defined ‘‘cultures’’ and ‘‘heritages’’, such subjects are deemed to be sell-outs, traitors inauthentic. But, says Chow, if such an ethnic scholar ‘‘should . . . choose, instead, to mimic and perform her own ethnicity’’ that is, to respond or perform in terms of the implicit and explicit hailing or interpellation of her as an ethnic subject as such, by playing along with the ‘‘mimetic enactment of the automatized stereotypes that are dangled out there in public, hailing the ethnic’’ (2002, 110) ‘‘she would still be considered a turncoat, this time because she is too eagerly pandering to the orientalist tastes of Westerners’’ (2002, 117), and this time most probably by other non-white ethnic subjects. Thus, the ethnic subject seems damned if he/she does and damned if he/she does not ‘‘be’’ an ethnic subject. Of course, this damnation comes from different parties, and with different implications. But, in any eventuality, Chow’s point is that, in sharp contradistinction, ‘‘however far he chooses to go, a white person sympathetic to or identifying with a nonwhite culture does not in any way become less white’’ (2002, 117). Indeed, she claims: When it comes to nonwhite peoples doing exactly the same thing . . . that is, becoming sympathetic to or identified with cultures other than their own we get a drastically different kind of evaluation. If an ethnic critic should simply ignore her own ethnic history and become immersed in white culture, she would, needless to say, be deemed a turncoat (one that forgets her origins). (2002, 117) It is important to be aware that it is not just whites who pressure the non-white ethnic to conform. Chow gives many examples of the ways that scholars of Chinese culture and literature, for instance, relentlessly produce an essentialist notion of China that is used to berate modern diasporic Chinese (and their cultural productions). This essentialism is an essence that none can live up to, precisely because they are alive and as such are contaminated, diluted, tainted or corrupted by non-Chinese influences. At least one side of this key difference between the white and the non-white is dramatized in the song by The Offspring. Whilst postcolonial critics often recount cases in which non-white ethnic subjects are pressured directly and indirectly to start to behave ‘‘properly’’ to act and think and be the way ‘‘they’’ are supposed to act and think and be as non-white ethnic subjects in other words, to be both interpellated, in Althusser’s sense, and disciplined, in Foucault’s sense I think that the very intelligibility of The Offspring’s song and its fairly unequivocal condemnation of the white-wannabe-non-white suggests that the white guy who shows too much interest in non-white culture, rather than being ‘‘applauded for being politically progressive and morally superior’’, can quite easily and will quite frequently be deemed not only ‘‘disloyal to his culture’’ but ridiculous. Yet, he remains no less white. In fact, it seems, he can become no less white. But he is still a traitor. Thus, corroborating Chow’s thesis, white ethnicity is here presented as absolutely immovable and essentially (or wholly/holy) incorruptible. All of this, Rey Chow calls ‘‘coercive mimeticism’’ (2002, 107). Coercive mimeticism designates the way in which the interpellating, disciplining forces of all different kinds of discourses and institutions call us into place, tell us our place, and work to keep us in our place. As Chow writes of the ethnic academic subject: ‘‘Her only viable option seems to be that of reproducing a specific version of herself and her ethnicity that has, somehow, already been endorsed and approved by the specialists of her culture’’ (2002, 117). Accordingly, coercive mimeticism ultimately works as ‘‘an institutionalized mechanism of knowledge production and dissemination, the point of which is to manage a non-Western ethnicity through the disciplinary promulgation of the supposed difference’’ (Chow 2002, 117). As we see through The Offspring’s song, this disciplinary mechanism extends far beyond the disciplines proper, far beyond the university. In Chow’s words: unlike the white man, who does not have to worry about impairing his identity even when he is touched by a foreign culture, the ethnic must work hard to keep hers; yet the harder she works at being bona fide, the more of an inferior representation she will appear to be. (2002, 124) Reciprocally, we might add, the harder the white guy tries to be non-white, the ‘‘more’’ white he will appear. In trying to be other so say the interpellating voices, tropes, discourses and institutions he is of course, just being silly. Whether this means that the white attempt to be like the other is silly, or that the other is silly or both is debatable. What is not debatable is that in all cases ‘‘authenticity’’ ultimately translates as a hypothetical state of non-self-conscious and nonconstructed essential ‘‘being’’. The fact that this is an essentialism that is essentially impossible does not mean that it does not ‘‘happen’’; rather, it means that ‘‘ethnicity’’ becomes an infinitely supple rhetorical tool. It is available (to anyone and everyone) as a way to disparage both anyone who is not being the way they are supposed to be and anyone who is being the way they are supposed to be. As Chow explains, ‘‘ethnicity can be used as a means of attacking others, of shaming, belittling, and reducing them to the condition of inauthenticity, disloyalty, and deceit’’ (2002, 124). Ironically, such attacks are ‘‘frequently issued by ethnics themselves against fellow ethnics, that is, the people who are closest to, who are most like them ethnically in this fraught trajectory of coercive mimeticism’’ (Chow 2002, 124). What this means is that the most contempt, from all quarters, will always be reserved for he or she who does not stay in their place, play their proper ethnicity. All too often, criticism is leveled individually, as if it is a personal issue, ‘‘despite the fact that this historically charged, alienating situation is a collectively experienced one’’ (Chow 2002, 124). Such is the disciplining, streaming, classifying force of coercive mimeticism. Such are the ‘‘uses of ethnicity’’. 334 P. Bowman In the words of Etienne Balibar: ‘‘the problem is to keep ‘in their place’, from generation to generation, those who have no fixed place; and for this, it is necessary that they have a genealogy’’ (Balibar, quoted in Chow 2002, 95). As such, even the work of sensitive, caring, deeply invested specialists, and expert ethnic scholars even ethnic experts in ethnicity themselves can function to reinforce ethnicized hierarchies, structured in dominance, simply by insisting on producing their field or object in its difference. What is at stake here is the surely significant fact that even the honest and principled or declared aim of studying others otherwise can actually amount to a positive working for the very forces one avowedly opposes or seeks to resist. Chow clarifies this in terms of considering the uncanny proximity but absolute difference between the disciplinary orientations of cultural studies and area studies. Area studies is a disciplinary field that ‘‘has long been producing ‘specialists’’ who report to North American political and civil arenas about ‘other’ civilizations, ‘other’ regimes, ‘other’ ways of life, and so forth’’ (Chow 1998, 6). However, quite unlike cultural studies’ and postcolonial studies’ declared aims and affiliative interests in alterity and ‘‘other cultures’’, within area studies ‘‘others’’ are ‘‘defined by way of particular geographical areas and nation states, such as South Asia, the Middle East, East Asia, Latin America, and countries of Africa’’ and are studied as if potential threats, challenges and hence ultimately ‘‘information target fields’’ (Chow 1998, 6).2 Thus, says Chow, there is ‘‘a major difference’’ between cultural studies and area studies and indeed between cultural studies and ‘‘normal’’ academic disciplines per se (Chow 1998, 67). This difference boils down to a paradigmatic decision. This is the resistance to ‘‘proper’’ disciplinarity precisely because of its disciplining effects; the resistance to becoming ‘‘normal’’ or ‘‘normalized’’, wherever this might equal allowing power inequalities, untranslatables and heterogeneities to evaporate in the production of universalistic ‘‘objective’’ knowledge (see also Mowitt 1992; Bowman 2007). This is why, as Robert J.C. Young has argued, anyone can do postcolonial studies (Young 2003). One simply has to start from below. This ‘‘below’’ always involves as thinkers from Edward Said to Stuart Hall have asserted something messy, dirty, mucky. This ‘‘below’’, then, evokes both class and sexuality and therefore ethnicity and gender.3 It must, as Stuart Hall once put it, work on two fronts at the same time, saying yes and no at the same time (Hall 1992, 285). That is to say, as Hall has always argued, just as the critical and political impetus and genealogy of cultural studies is a simultaneously interdisciplinary and antidisciplinary ‘‘self-reflexive’’ field (i.e. self-consciously theoretical and performative), it is also constitutively wedded to critical and political issues cortical to postcolonialism (i.e. those of language, power, culture, class, gender, and ethnicity). So if it is of anything that ‘‘I am’’, or this writing is the offspring, it is this disciplinary chiasmus or, rather, this unrepentant undisciplined mess. Settling the genealogy of such a tangle has no proper place. Knowingly inhabiting this tangle in a particular way is vital. Such is the orientation of Rey Chow’s ongoing body of work.